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“Cheap merchandise”: atrocity and undocumented migrants in transit in Mexico’s 
war on drugs 
 
Javier Trevino-Rangel, University of Northumbria, UK 
 
Abstract 
Undocumented migrants in transit in Mexico are victims of atrocity. The subject has been 
largely ignored by scholars, however, until recently when a number of migration experts 
became interested in the matter. Most observers argue that abuses suffered by migrants are 
the consequence of the “securitization” of Mexican immigration policy. For them, Mexican 
authorities perceive migrants from Central America as a threat to national security and have 
hardened laws and migratory practices as a result, but there is insufficient evidence to 
support these claims. This article looks at the political economy of undocumented 
migration in transit in Mexico and the violence associated with it. It investigates the abuses 
suffered by migrants not as the result of supposed security policies, but rather as the 
consequence of the interplay between local and global economies that generate profits from 
undocumented migration. The article explores the role played by state officials, cartels, and 
ordinary Mexicans in the migration industry. 
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Introduction 
In 2008, the government of the state of Chiapas, in southern Mexico, created the Office of 
the Special Prosecutor for Crimes Committed against Immigrants. It was a unique institution 
created specifically to address a problem that ordinary institutions had not been able to 
address: the abuses perpetrated against undocumented foreigners, mainly from Central 
America, passing through the state. One of the Special Prosecutor’s achievements was the 
arrest of a 57-year-old rancher who cheated migrants by giving them instructions to follow a 
path that led them to an open-air dump where armed men then assaulted them. Two 
Hondurans presented a complaint against the rancher. Five days later, they were still waiting 
for the call from the Special Prosecutor’s Office in order to deliver their statement. They 
faced a dilemma: they wanted to continue on their journey, but if they did not testify then the 
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rancher would be released, their accusation would have been in vain, and justice would never 
be served (Martínez, 2012: 43). 
Scholars have largely ignored the issue of undocumented migrants in transit in 
Mexico. The topic gained some prominence in 2010, when the press reported the discovery 
of 72 corpses of foreigners at the ranch of San Fernando in the state of Tamaulipas in northern 
Mexico (Tuckman, 2010). From then on, an increasing number of new migration experts 
became interested in the matter (Aikin & Anaya, 2013; París & Müller, 2016). Since 2010 
diverse human rights organizations have agreed that it is “clear that migrants in transit 
through Mexico are victims of multiple crimes and human rights violations, such as 
kidnapping, human trafficking, enforced disappearance, sexual violence, assault, and 
aggravated robbery” (Knippen et al., 2015). 
In the last decade, most observers have argued that abuses suffered by migrants are 
the consequence of what is called the “securitization” of Mexican immigration policy (e.g., 
Armijo, 2011; Basok, 2019; Basok & Rojas Wiesner, 2018; Castillo & Toussaint, 2010; 
Hernández López et al., 2019; Instituto de Estudios y Divulgación sobre Migración 
[INEDIM], 2011; Leutert, 2018; Rodríguez Moreno, 2016; Washington Office on Latin 
America [WOLA], 2012). They contend that the Mexican government perceives 
undocumented migrants in transit to be a threat to national security and has hardened laws 
and migratory practices as a result. The alleged securitization of migration – the toughening 
of existing laws and practices – may have facilitated the exploitation of migrants. However, 
as recent studies on the matter have demonstrated, the securitization of migration is an 
incomplete explanation for the abuses migrants suffer, which overlooks other factors (París 
et al., 2015; Treviño-Rangel, 2016). The story of the Hondurans mentioned earlier shows that 
this problem is far more complex. Those Honduran migrants were not deceived by a rancher 
and later assaulted by armed men because they were perceived to be a threat to national 
security. They were assaulted by men who saw in them an opportunity to make a financial 
gain. 
This article explores the political economy of undocumented migration in transit in 
Mexico and the violence associated with it in order to understand the abuses suffered by 
migrants not as the result of supposed security policies, but rather as the consequence of the 
interplay between local and global economies that generate profits from undocumented 
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migration. Central American migrants meet the demand for cheap labor in the United States, 
providing a guaranteed supply of exploitable and dispensable workers. At the same time, they 
transfer a portion of their wages back to their home countries through remittances, which 
serve as income for their impoverished families. This process has been widely explored by 
multiple studies on international migration (e.g., Massey et al., 1993). What is less known is 
the story of how a multiplicity of actors in Mexico make money out of undocumented Central 
American migrants who cross the country, and how fear, violence, and atrocity are crucial 
factors in this process. 
In Mexico the undocumented migration of Central Americans is a big business. There 
is a well-established “migration industry”, a “wide assembly of actors” whose existence 
increasingly depends on “money paid either to facilitate or to constrain” the transit of 
undocumented migrants (Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2012). In this context, I argue, 
migrants have become commodities: objects with a certain economic value that are 
exchanged (Appadurai, 1986: 3). But they are disposable commodities: perfectly dispensable 
and replaceable. They are dispensable because, as the testimonies collected for this 
investigation illustrate, Central American migrants in Mexico are easily exterminated, for 
example, when they cannot be exploited or used to generate money. They are replaceable 
because the supply of new migrants never ends. The commodification of Central American 
migrants implies that they endure a process of “dehumanization”, which is intrinsic to the 
exploitative practices of which they are victims (Sharp, 2000: 293). 
The article critically explores how undocumented migrants in Mexico came to be 
framed as, to use Primo Levi’s term, “cheap merchandise” embarked on a “journey towards 
nothingness” (Levi, 1987: 17). By doing so, this article moves from the dominant story about 
what is currently happening to transmigrants in Mexico, according to which they are seen as 
a threat to national security and hence suffer abuses – an account shared as an article of faith 
by most experts on the matter – to another story, which illustrates how the lives of 
undocumented migrants are considered to be a “thing” that is dispensable – an account that 
is considerably more ambiguous and troubling.  
 
Methods 
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The article draws mainly on reports published by non-governmental organizations, activists, 
and the mass media, and official documents released by the Mexican government. It also 
draws on 88 semi-structured in-depth interviews with undocumented migrants, experts, and 
agents of the Mexican state who have some link with the deployment of migration policies 
in Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Most of the interviews were audio recorded and 
transcribed. For security reasons, the identities of the interviewees are kept confidential.1 
I began this research by reading the reports published by activists and experts on the 
subject. These reports differed in the basic information they presented: for example, in the 
number of undocumented migrants crossing Mexico or in the discussion about whether the 
country’s southern border was heavily controlled or not controlled at all. It was interesting 
that, despite these divergences, they all shared two basic ideas: Mexican migration policy is 
securitized; and securitization is the cause of the abuses committed against migrants. In other 
words, securitization seemed to be the answer that explained everything about transit 
migration: either the increase or decrease in the number of migrants crossing Mexico, or the 
argument that Mexico’s border with Guatemala was heavily guarded by authorities or that 
that same border lacked surveillance at all. So I decided to conduct interviews with activists, 
experts, and journalists who are part of the growing number of non-governmental human 
rights organizations working on migration issues. Even if they worked in the same 
organization, interviewees sometimes had divergent opinions on specific issues about transit 
migration, but they all had the same view of the securitization argument. The interviewees 
validated what can be found in the human rights reports, as – surprisingly – did state agents 
from El Salvador and Guatemala whom I interviewed for this research. Securitization is a 
powerful and familiar trope that permeates the thinking of most activists and state agents 
involved in the defense of migrants’ rights. 
 
Context 
Mexico has historically been a transit point for migrants from Central America. During their 
brief stay in Mexico, migrants have long suffered abuses from the country’s authorities, 
mainly migration officials, including arbitrary arrest, lack of due process, and confinement 
in deplorable conditions in disturbing governmental detention centers, euphemistically 
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known as “migratory stations” (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [IACHR], 
2013: 41). 
However, a violent increase in the number and brutality of the abuses perpetrated 
against undocumented migrants in transit – mass kidnapping and mass murder, torture, 
disappearances, trafficking of persons and organs – began in 2006. This change in the pattern 
of abuses has been coterminous with the country’s “war on drugs”, which was launched by 
former president Felipe Calderón (2006–2012) (IACHR, 2013: 42). In December 2006, 
Calderón began a “war” against organized crime. Since then, more than 50,000 members of 
the military have been involved in what is known by the all-encompassing term 
“counternarcotics operations”. This provisional strategy to supposedly fight organized crime 
and to end with drug-related violence continues today, became permanent, and has led to an 
unprecedented wave of violence; for example, more than 260,000 people have been killed in 
the country, and 62,000 people vanished between 2006 and 2019 (Comisión Nacional de 
Búsqueda de Personas, 2020; Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad 
Pública, 2019a, 2019b; 2019c).  
Before continuing, it is important to clarify what Mexico’s “war on drugs” is all about. 
Paley (2014: 16) rightly notes that Mexico’s “war on drugs” is not about prohibition or drug 
policy, but about terror that is “used against the population in cities and rural areas”, terror 
that facilitates “foreign direct investment and economic growth”. In other words: 
The violence deployed by the state and justified with claims of combating trafficking can lead 
to urban and rural populations being displaced, clearing territory for corporations to extract 
natural resources, and impacting land ownership and property values…It creates institutional 
(legal and social) conditions that guarantee protection for foreign direct investment, creating 
the necessary conditions for capitalist expansion and flexible accumulation (Paley, 2014: 34). 
 
Consequently, “drug cartels” are not necessarily trading with illicit drugs. Cartels, as 
Lomnitz (2019: 97) claims, “rely essentially on the armed privatization of public space, the 
ransom of public liberties, and the forcible appropriation of public goods”: they are “involved 
in the regulation of activities as diverse as... mining, fishing, logging, commercial agriculture, 
street vending, prostitution, illegal gasoline traffic, construction, arms trafficking”. Finally, 
and crucially, cartels are involved in the business of undocumented migration (París, 2017: 
145).  
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It is also important to emphasize that the “war on drugs” seeks to control through the 
military and the use of force the social, economic, and cultural changes that the neoliberal 
policies implemented in Mexico since 1980 brought with them.2 The neoliberal policies 
promoted in the country over the last 30 years led to structural changes in Mexico’s economy 
and society that, in turn, facilitated drug trafficking and the increase in criminal activity in at 
least two ways. First, the flow of narcotics was further magnified by the neoliberal reforms 
that increased commerce across the US–Mexico border and facilitated the smuggling of large 
quantities of drugs (Mercille, 2011: 1642). Second, neoliberal policies have failed to generate 
jobs or increase wages. On the contrary, these economic policies have “led to a deterioration 
of essential services and economic conditions, resulting in the exclusion of large sectors of 
the population from education and employment opportunities” (Gamlin and Hawkes, 2018: 
52). Thus, the “mass of unemployed or underemployed in Mexico” has “constituted a perfect 
supply of desperate labor for the cartels” (Mercille, 2011: 1642). As Gamlin and Hawkes 
(2018: 52) argue: 
The more than seven million young Mexicans between the ages of 16 and 29… who comprise 
this “industrial reserve army”… referred to derogatively as ni-nis since they are neither 
employed nor in education, have become the waste products of economic restructuring, left 
with little option but to make a living in the already saturated informal sector… an increasing 
proportion of which is controlled by organized crime. 
 
The migration industry has thrived in this context. In 2009, the National Commission 
on Human Rights (NCHR), the country’s highest institution responsible for protecting and 
investigating human rights violations, reported that every year at least 18,000 undocumented 
foreign citizens are kidnapped in Mexico (NCHR, 2009). Those kidnapped are taken on 
different forms of transport, they travel in precarious conditions, sometimes for days, from 
the place of capture to the premises where they are kept incommunicado: a hotel, a ranch, a 
“safe house” (the euphemism commonly used in Mexico to name houses in which migrants 
– or Mexicans – are illegally detained). Once in detention, migrants become victims of ill-
treatment, torture, and extortion (Knippen et al., 2015: 19). Men and especially women are 
victims of sexual abuse. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has demonstrated that migrants 
are kept in captivity, crowded with more than 400 people. Some migrants reported how they 
witnessed mass murders in which dozens of people lost their lives; and how they observed 
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the mutilation or decapitation of their companions, the death of others by hammering, and 
the dissolution in acid of human remains (IACHR, 2013: 67). The kidnappers – mainly 
members of cartels – demand sums of money from the abducted migrants or their families 
that start at US$5,000 and can be much higher (IACHR, 2013: 51). The ransom payment 
does not guarantee their release, however (Knippen et al., 2015: 19). Some migrants are 
killed. Others must perform forced labor. Men are employed as hitmen or vigilantes, and also 
to transport drugs (IACHR, 2013: 64).3 
In 2010 the press reported that 58 men and 14 women had been massacred in the state 
of Tamaulipas. The majority of the 72 corpses were of Central American citizens who were 
only in transit through Mexico to reach the United States. The government’s response at the 
time was to blame the criminal group Los Zetas. Subsequent investigations into what 
happened showed that the kidnapping of 72 migrants who were later murdered would have 
been unthinkable without the diligent participation of multiple state agents (Evans, 2014; Poy 
Solano, 2014). For months, different police corporations and members of Mexico’s National 
Institute of Migration illegally detained these foreign citizens, for example, when they 
traveled in passenger buses. Then migrants were handed over to the criminal group Los Zetas, 
an organization originally formed, and trained, by former members of the Mexican Army. 
A cursory glance at this information does not seem to indicate that migrants in transit 
are victims of atrocious acts as a result of migratory policies that have allegedly been 
securitized. We seem to be witnessing a process of dehumanization, in which the lives of 
migrants are considered to be superfluous, unnecessary, disposable, but useful to generate 
some kind of profit. 
 
The securitization of Mexican immigration policy 
The limited literature on this subject conveys that the cause of the abuses currently suffered 
by migrants is the recent “securitization” of Mexican migration policy (Armijo, 2011; Basok, 
2019; Basok y Rojas Wiesner, 2018; Castillo & Toussaint, 2010; Hernández López et al., 
2019; INEDIM, 2011; Leutert, 2018; Rodríguez Moreno, 2016; WOLA, 2012). With certain 
variations and nuances, the securitization of Mexico’s immigration policies is understood as 
follows. First, in the last 15 years, the government shifted its migration policy, which now 
frames immigration as a threat to national security and, therefore, deploys a series of laws 
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and mechanisms to neutralize this threat. Second, the United States government is behind 
this change in Mexico’s migration policy (Basok, 2019: 89; Leutert, 2018: 16). Since the 
terrorist attacks that took place in New York on September 11, 2001, the United States 
government has perceived documented and undocumented migration to be a potential danger 
to national security. Subsequently, the argument goes, the United States imposed this vision 
on the Mexican government. 
According to human rights organizations, the securitization of migration in Mexico 
is the reason behind the atrocities perpetrated against migrants in transit. The securitization 
of migration, these organizations claim, has led to the recent “intensification of migration 
enforcement operations throughout Mexico”, the mushrooming of “new checkpoints in the 
southern border region”, and the deployment of “frequent raids on hotels where migrants are 
known to stay” (Knippen et al., 2015: 5). This, in turn, “exacerbated the patterns of crimes 
and human rights violations against migrants” because: 
Migration is more clandestine than ever, as migrants and smugglers have sought to avoid the 
checkpoints and raids that have proliferated… all over the country. This has had an impact 
on the routes migrants use, inasmuch as they have had to look for alternatives, including 
traveling on foot, which makes them easy prey for criminal gangs (Knippen et al., 2015: 6). 
 
However, I suggest, this theory should be used cautiously when explaining what is 
happening in Mexico. There are at least three reasons for this. First, authors promoting ideas 
about securitization claim that new legal provisions in Mexico currently link the issue of 
migration with that of national security (Hernández López et al., 2019). That is the case, the 
argument goes, for the most recent Migration Law in Mexico, established in 2011 (Basok & 
Rojas, 2017: 3; INEDIM, 2011: 21; Leutert, 2018: 16; Rodríguez Moreno, 2016: 112; 
WOLA, 2012: 15). However, this is not entirely correct. These authors seem to be unaware 
that the link between notions of security and migration in Mexican immigration laws is not 
something new; nor is it something imposed by the United States since 2001. The connection 
between immigration and ideas about security in Mexico’s immigration laws can be traced 
to the 19th century. The Constitution of 1857, for example, stated that the government could 
expel foreigners considered “harmful” from the country (Constitución Federal de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, 1857). The Immigration Law of 1909 prohibited the entry into the 
country of people who were considered a risk: for example, people with “communicable 
diseases”, with “mental illness”, people with “epilepsy”, the “old”, “blind”, “lame”, “one-
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armed”, “crippled”, people with some kind of “deformity”, those “useless for work”, 
“beggars and the poor”, “prostitutes” (Ley de Inmigración, 1909). 
Second, these authors argue that migration policy is securitized because the Mexican 
government has deployed new practices that significantly affect undocumented migrants 
(Hernández López et al., 2019: 8). For example, the authorities of the National Institute of 
Migration, with the help of the Federal Police or the militarized National Guard, install what 
are euphemistically referred to as “migratory filters” – checkpoints – across the country 
(Leutert, 2018: 16). It is true that the Mexican government is implementing migratory 
practices – such as “migratory filters” – that are questionable and unconstitutional. However, 
these practices were not imposed by the United States as of 2001. They have formally existed 
throughout at least the last 50 years. The Migration Law of 1930, for instance, established 
that local or federal security forces could assist migratory agents to carry out their duties (Ley 
de Migración, 1930). The General Population Law of 1974 allowed only certain foreigners 
to enter Mexico, only those who were “useful for the country”. The police forces were 
authorized to assist the immigration authorities. The discretionary deployment of migratory 
establishments within the country was legally established in the form of “migration filters” 
and “migratory stations”. Undocumented migration was considered a crime punishable by 
two years in prison (Ley General de Población, 1974).4 
Finally, an issue is securitized through language, through a discourse that represents 
something – immigration, for example – as a threat. Basok and Rojas (2017: 15) argue that 
the Mexico “continues to portray Central American migrants as a threat to national and public 
security”. However, these authors provide no evidence to support their claims. In fact, an 
analysis of official documents, public statements, and speeches shows that something like 
the opposite is happening. The Mexican government has never suggested publicly that transit 
migration is a danger. On the contrary, the creation or transformation of immigration laws, 
and the deployment of migratory practices, have been justified in the name of human rights. 
For instance, according to the government’s official discourse, police officers are not 
“detaining” migrants, but “rescuing” them in order to “protect” them. In Mexico, the policies 
that facilitate the commission of atrocity are authorized and legitimized in the name of human 
rights.  
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Mexico is not exceptional in this respect. For example, Williams (2016: 27) has 
pointed out that the United States government uses human rights jargon to deploy restrictive 
immigration policies legitimately. Border enforcement efforts are going through a process of 
“humanitarisation”: “a humanitarian discourse” is “integrated into the way in which border 
enforcement efforts are both framed and justified”. Williams warns that most academic 
research on international migration has focused on analyzing the alleged securitization of 
migration policies, even though “humanitarian discourses” are increasingly “mobilised to 
justify violent state policies” (Williams, 2016: 28). What happens in Mexico proves him 
right. 
So, the alleged securitisation of migration does not seem to be an entirely convincing 
explanation. This article focuses on the analysis of what is happening in Mexico. However, 
the findings of this research may be useful in exploring other cases that have been analysed 
through the lens of securitisation, cases that could well be understood through a political 
economy analysis. 
 
“Cheap merchandise” 
The political economy of transit migration and the violence associated with it can serve as an 
alternative approach to securitization theories. This approach helps us to understand atrocity 
not only as the result of restrictive migration policies, but as the effect of the confluence of 
global and local economies profiting from undocumented migration. 
In their countries of origin – El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras – migrants are victims 
of structural violence, “indirect forms of harm exerted by social structures and institutions” 
(Gamlin and Hawkes, 2018: 53), for instance, poverty and deprivation. They are dispossessed 
people who are forced to migrate in order to survive. In these countries, “transnational 
migration is considered the only way to escape both physical and social death” (Vogt, 2013: 
769).  
Migrants travel to the United States because there they satisfy the demand for labor. 
Once in the United States, undocumented migrants become a surplus population: “this 
population is a cheap and accessible source of labor, a reserve army” (Rajaram, 2018: 630). 
Capital accumulation requires such industrial reserve army “to soak up labor shortages and 
drive down wages” (Merrill, 2011: 1548). The emergence of a surplus population is not, 
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however, “an accidental phenomenon” but rather a “structural necessity for the very 
development of capitalism” (Shammas, 2018: 306). From this perspective, undocumented 
migrants are “not simply excluded, but included through their exclusion as cheaply 
exploitable and dispensable labor” (Rajaram, 2018: 628).  
Yet, undocumented migrants manage to transfer money back to their impoverished 
communities of origin. Remittances are an important source of income for many families in 
Central America. Thus, the labor and exploitation of migrants have value in both the United 
States and Central American economies (Vogt, 2013). 
This cycle of migration has been widely studied from different theoretical angles 
(Massey et al., 1993). Despite their discrepancies in some conceptual aspects, most existing 
studies on migration to the United States concur that the endless flow of migrants is made 
possible by what is known as the “migration industry”: the multiplicity of actors who depend 
on the money generated by actions that facilitate or constrain migration mobility – for 
instance: “specialised transportation companies, visa facilitation agencies, labor recruiters, 
security contractors” (Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2012: 1). One branch of this 
migration industry generates abundant profits from providing services to migrants seeking to 
enter the United States illegally and obtain the required documents to work there: this 
includes business related to migrant smuggling, the production of “fraudulent documents 
such as social security cards, birth certificates, visas, and passports”, and labor contracts 
(Douglas and Sáenz, 2013: 209; Trujillo-Pagán, 2014: 38). 
But there is another branch of this industry that has recently emerged in the United 
States to criminalize and hence to apprehend, detain, and deport migrants – what is known 
as the “immigration industrial complex” (Doty and Wheatley, 2013; Golash-Boza, 2009a). 
There are multiple corporations that establish or extend their business ventures to house 
immigrant detainees in the United States through contracts with the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement. In other words, “one sector that has profited from increased 
immigration enforcement has been the privately run immigrant detention centers” (Golash-
Boza, 2009b: 290). So, in the United States, “to some, undocumented immigrants represented 
a threat to their way of life”, however, “to enterprising entrepreneurs, immigrants represented 
potential profit, and to many local officials, immigrants represented the key to healthy 
budgets and job protection” (Douglas and Sáenz, 2013: 212).5 
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To reach the United States, migrants must pass through Mexico. Yet, the way the 
migration industry works in Mexico, and how fear and atrocity are a significant part of it, are 
issues largely ignored by the literature on the subject. Before becoming an inexpensive source 
of labor in the United States, Central American migrants in transit in Mexico are transformed 
into commodities: things with a certain economic value that are exchanged, “useful objects 
of exchange and exploitation” (Appadurai, 1986: 3; Vogt, 2013: 765). 
The mass kidnapping of migrants is a lucrative business, which every year generates 
at least US$50 million, according to estimates from the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR, 2013: 54). Beyond this business, according to a human rights 
activist, migrants who travel through the country pay between US$2,000 and US$9,000 to 
cover different costs incurred from their countries of origin in Central America to the United 
States (Interview, 22 August 2013). Most undocumented migrants interviewed for this 
research said that this money serves to pay one or several polleros or smugglers who “guide” 
the migrants during their journey.  
But the money is also used to pay the bribes charged by various state officials. This 
includes mainly the security forces – members of the traffic police, municipal police, Federal 
Police, agents of the National Institute of Migration, and personnel of the armed forces – who 
undocumented migrants encounter during their journey, e.g. in buses, at roadblocks, in bus 
terminals, on the street. In the United States, state actors benefit from the business of 
migration by legally constraining migratory mobility. In Mexico, state agents participate in 
the migration industry by both facilitating and constraining, legally or illegally, the transit of 
migrants.  
Finally, the money serves to pay and keep out ordinary Mexicans. Migrants are 
perfectly identifiable for multiple Mexican citizens who provide different services at elevated 
costs, such as taxi rides or a night in a hotel. The cost of these activities comes with a 
surcharge for migrants because they have no alternative: they either pay or they do not sleep 
at the hotel or they do not take the taxi. Sometimes these interactions between undocumented 
migrants and Mexican citizens are accompanied by a threat: either migrants accept the 
elevated cost of any service or they are warned that they will be handed over to immigration 
authorities, the police, or a criminal group. If they are transferred to members of organized 
crime, it is possible that, after extortion, they end up dead or doing forced labor. If they are 
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delivered to state authorities, it is possible that, after extortion, they end up in a detention 
center (“migratory station”) and are later deported to their countries – from which they fled 
to escape death – or sold to an organized crime group in Mexico that will extort them again 
and then kill them. 
This business of migration is visibly successful. It involves not only members of 
organized crime, but also multiple agents of the Mexican state, for whom migrants are not a 
threat to security, but rather an opportunity to generate additional income, to enjoy social 
mobility. Additionally, a considerable number of ordinary Mexicans also take part in this, 
those not part of organized crime (at least not formally) or of the state. Thus, Central 
American migrants in Mexico become commodities because they are visibly stripped of all 
dignity. Commodification, as Sharp (2000: 293) points out, “insists upon objectification in 
some form, transforming persons and their bodies from a human category into objects of 
economic desire”. They go through a process of dehumanization. While in transit, as Vogt 
(2013: 765) has shown, Central American migrants are “valued in various combinations of 
cargo to smuggle, gendered bodies to sell, labor to exploit, organs to traffic and lives to 
exchange for cash”. So, the social worth of undocumented migrants “depends heavily on 
their economic value” (Sharp, 2000: 293). 
At the same time, these are commodities that are disposable, because their destruction 
seems irrelevant. Undocumented migrants in Mexico are seen as “cheap merchandise” (Levi, 
1987: 17). As the testimonies gathered for this investigation show, Central American 
migrants are easily swept away when they are no longer exploitable, when they cannot 
generate profits, when their bodies or body parts are of no further use. The value of migrants 
diminishes once they can “no longer be used to extract larger sums of money” (Vogt, 2013: 
773). Those involved in the migration industry know that the flow of migrants never stops. 
Migrants are commodities that can be exterminated because they can easily be replaced. 
 
Migrants: “from consumers of goods” to “being commodities themselves” 
In what follows, I illustrate this process of “thingification” (Taussig, 1980: 3) of 
undocumented migrants in Mexico, though a clarification is needed before moving forward. 
In the context of Mexico’s war on drugs, it is difficult to delineate a clear taxonomy of 
perpetrators of abuses. Some “formal” members of cartels were security agents of the 
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Mexican government in the past. Others are part of both types of organizations: they work 
for the state and for organized crime, formally or informally – they have multiple affiliations. 
There are ordinary citizens who do not belong formally to any criminal organization or to the 
state bureaucracy, but they get involved in wrongful activities and sometimes facilitate 
cartels’ operations or collaborate occasionally in the perpetration of atrocities committed by 
state officials. There seem to be no clearly defined boundaries between organized crime, 
ordinary citizens, and state agents, nor between the types of participation that here, perhaps 
prematurely, I refer to as “formal” and “informal”. 
 
Cartels 
The business of migration in Mexico is nourished by the involvement of cartels whose 
networks reach from the Central American region to the United States. This “industry” 
expanded and strengthened since 2006, when former president Felipe Calderón launched his 
“war on drugs”. In the past, polleros or smugglers were respected members of the local 
communities and guided migrants safely in exchange for a quota. Today, migration is the 
business of armed and murderous criminal groups that traffic migrants and commit 
unspeakable abuses against them (París, 2017: 136). In the context of the “war on drugs”, 
cartels saw in transit migration a simple and highly lucrative business and chose to engage 
in it (París, 2017: 157). 
A staff member of a state human rights commission in southeastern Mexico put it this 
way: the change in the pattern of abuses experienced by migrants is closely related to the 
diversification of cartels – as they “diversify their activities, they begin to see the migrant as 
a gold mine” (Interview, 13 May 2013). He concluded, “we are faced with the systematic 
presence of organized crime gangs that are very aware of the logistical operation of the trains” 
– freight trains used by migrants to traverse the country. 
In my research I frequently heard testimonies of how cartels extorted and killed 
migrants on trains. A migrant from Guatemala explained how those who traveled with him 
and had no money left to pay the amount requested by members of cartels were thrown out 
of the train: “They kicked people off the train; I saw someone whose leg was cut off by the 
wheels of the train” (Interview, 19 August 2013). A young migrant from El Salvador said: 
“Yes, I witnessed many cases of migrants that didn’t have enough money [to pay criminal 
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organizations]. They were killed, forced to leave the train or simply thrown out of it... some 
were shot right there” (Interview, 19 August 2013). Another migrant told me: 
I was asked to get off the train by the smuggler. There was a checkpoint, but I was told that 
that was not a “normal” checkpoint. We kept walking. When we arrived, the persons there 
were well dressed, heavily armed, they had 4x4 cars, they were “Zetas”. Many migrants could 
not pay, so they were given a backpack [with drugs] and were told to carry the “package”, 
which would be collected later [by other members of the cartel] (Interview, 19 August 2013). 
  
This business entails mass kidnapping of migrants who are then extorted, and who 
are subjected to different forms of exploitation, such as forced labor, prostitution, human 
trafficking, drug transportation. One migrant survived and described his experience: “I was 
kidnapped for seventeen days. Between three and five new persons were abducted daily.” 
Women were raped and forced to prostitute themselves: “women who came back every night 
sadder, more wounded, beaten”. “We were forced to stand up in front of a wall with our legs 
wide open”, he continues, “then they [members of the cartel] beat us with a board until we 
fell to our knees, crying... Those who didn’t pay the ransom were taken outside... [the house 
by members of the cartel]... to see the stars up close” [to be killed] (NHRC, 2011: 76). 
The best explanation of what happens was offered by Federico Mastrogiovanni (2013: 
53), an Italian journalist who was one of the first reporters to travel through Mexico alongside 
undocumented migrants. He observed that the change in the interaction of cartels with transit 
migration occurred gradually: Central American migrants “went from being a consumer of 
goods and services” to being a “commodity themselves”.6 
 
State officials 
The migration industry is possible because of the involvement of many agents of the Mexican 
government, mainly the security forces. Their participation occurs in three ways: as 
bystanders, assistants, and executioners. 
Bystanders. There are state officials who are not victims nor perpetrators of abuses, 
but who facilitate atrocity with their silence and inaction. Mexico’s NCHR documented that 
every month more than 30 events of mass kidnapping take place. During each one around 50 
migrants are abducted (NCHR, 2009: 11). A migrant from Honduras told his story. He was 
traveling with a smuggler who sold him to a cartel in the state of Veracruz. He was then 
transferred to the state of Tamaulipas, in northern Mexico, with another 80 abducted 
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migrants. They traveled in two buses, 40 migrants in each bus. According to the testimony 
of this person, there were already 140 migrants in the “safe house” where he was kept in 
captivity. He was detained for two months (NCHR, 2009: 39). More than 80 people cannot 
disappear at the same time without security authorities registering it. It is unlikely that 
criminal groups can detain more than 200 people in a house for weeks without the security 
forces having information about it. 
Multiple migrant testimonies concur that mass kidnapping takes place near the 
numerous locations where security forces are present, such as checkpoints and military or 
police offices. Most migrants interviewed for this research agreed that once kidnaped, as they 
are transferred from one city to another, they pass several checkpoints organized by Mexico’s 
security forces, but they are never stopped. These state agents know what is happening. They 
know well the future that awaits these Central American citizens: extortion, torture. The 
actions of these state agents do not seem to be inspired by any sense of securitization: rather 
than seeking to capture migrants who are seen as a peril to the nation, they prefer to ignore 
those migrants when they are kidnapped by cartels. 
So far, I have described the role played by some grassroots officials who are in charge 
of checkpoints or patrolling the streets. But there are many senior officials in the federal 
government who have abundant knowledge about the corruption of local police officers, 
about the abuses committed against migrants by security forces, but prefer to act as if they 
know nothing. I asked a migrant from Guatemala the reasons behind this. He replied: 
This is a one million question. Because the government in this country knows that these things 
are happening, but they do not take action on the matter because they [senior officials] get 
some benefits out it in one way or another. I don’t want to talk badly about Mexico, but you 
can hear it everywhere: [a] certain amount of the money charged to undocumented migrants 
goes to the government. In the long run, they [senior officials] are also beneficiaries of our 
money, definitely (Interview, August 2013).  
 
Assistants. Other state agents actively collaborate with cartels. A migrant from 
Honduras who was kept in captivity for nine days told the story of what he saw: “I never 
lodged a complaint with the police, because I knew the police were involved. Police officers 
with [a] white shirt and trousers went four or five times to the ‘safe house’ where I was held” 
(NCHR, 2009: 38). This is how a migrant whom I interviewed in Guatemala narrated his 
experience in Mexico:  
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Municipal police officers were on the side of criminals. The police stop by the safe house 
[where he was kept] every day. Then members of the cartel gave them money, a payment. 
Otherwise, the police would have helped us to get out, but they didn’t. They did nothing to 
help us (Interview, August 2013). 
 
A migrant from El Salvador explained how he traveled through Mexico: 
** How did you manage to get to the US? Did you travel by yourself or did you hire 
a smuggler? 
Migrant I hired a smuggler. I paid him 7,000 American dollars. I traveled together with my 
girlfriend. So, in total, I paid 14,000 dollars. 
** How did you travel throughout the journey? What means of transport did you use? 
Migrant We traveled half the way by bus, and the other half in a van. 
** Whose van was that? 
Migrant It belonged to Mexico’s Federal Police. 
 
Executioners. Finally, there are state agents who perpetrate abuses. For example, 
those who illegally detain migrants in passenger buses, bus stations, police checkpoints, or 
the streets, and then sell them to organized crime groups. One testimony comes from a 
migrant from El Salvador: 
In fact, the criminals are the authorities themselves. The cartel of Los Zetas takes care of 
people. The Federal Police kill those migrants who complain or those who are kidnaped. At 
some point during my journey, I was together with other migrants in the hands of smugglers 
and the cartel of Los Zetas. Suddenly, a group of members of the Federal Police arrived and 
the smugglers and members of Los Zetas hide themselves. Then, the Police approached us 
and asked what we were doing. I said that we were doing nothing. But another migrant said 
we were kidnaped. So, the very same Federal Police detained this guy and handed him over 
to members of Los Zetas that were allegedly hidden. They killed him right there. The only 
thing the police did to me was to take away my money and belongings (Interview, August 
2013).  
 
Certainly, within this third category of state agents there are also those who actively 
participate in the migration industry without having links with organized crime. There are 
officers who illegally detain migrants in order to extort them. Most individuals interviewed 
for this study talked about the amounts charged by state agents to refrain from detaining 
migrants. This toll guarantees the freedom of migrants until they arrive at another police 
checkpoint or encounter another migration official. One useful example: a migrant from 
Guatemala explains how the Federal Police put a checkpoint on the highway. The police 
stopped an ordinary passenger bus, most of the passengers were Mexican, but there was also 
a group of Guatemalan citizens traveling in it. The Federal Police forced all the passengers 
who, according to their racial and racist criteria, appeared “Central American” to get off the 
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bus. Only the Mexicans who could prove their nationality were allowed to return to the bus. 
The Guatemalans were illegally detained while the police requested a bribe from the 
“smuggler” who accompanied them. When they obtained the sum of money they requested, 
the police halted – arbitrarily and, again, perhaps unconstitutionally – another passenger bus 
passing through that road and forced the driver to transport the Guatemalans (Interview, 20 
August 2013). 
 
Ordinary Mexicans 
The brutal and large-scale business of transit migration is often assisted by ordinary citizens 
who do not necessarily form part of organized crime or the state bureaucracy. I have 
identified at least three ways in which they do this: as beneficiaries, collaborators, or 
perpetrators. 
Beneficiaries. Regardless of whether they make the trip alone, in groups, or 
accompanied by a smuggler, migrants take taxis, eat in humble restaurants, and spend the 
night in modest hotels. But migrants are usually required to pay a higher price than the 
standard rate. A human rights officer offered an example: 
It is an impressive generation of money. That is, everyone benefits. In the neighborhood of 
Lechería, a 600-milliliter Coca-Cola bottle costs 30 pesos for a migrant, plus the businesses 
where they eat, plus the businesses where they are allowed to sleep. This, all that population, 
Internet cafes... the costs, phone calls to their homes, to their countries of origin... I mean, 
that is why I say this, it is a matter of [generating] money. Migrants generate an impressive 
amount of money and ordinary citizens [benefit] from this (Interview, 13 February 2014). 
 
Similar events happen in pharmacies: 
I went to a store because I had a very upset stomach, severe diarrhea and I told him [the 
person in charge of the pharmacy]: “Hey, can you sell me some pills?” And he sold them to 
me at a much higher price than they were worth. It seems they were worth three pesos, it was 
some Alka-Seltzer or something for diarrhea... and I got two pills for $10 (Interview, 19 
August 2013). 
 
The extreme occurs in places where migrants must pay for things that are normally free: “if 
I wanted to put salt in the food they charged me 3 pesos” (Interview, 23 August 2013). 
Collaborators. There are ordinary Mexicans who are not formally members of cartels, 
but who actively collaborate with them. According to a human rights activist in Guatemala, 
“safe houses” in Mexico can operate, in part, because many ordinary citizens assist those 
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running them in various ways: taxi drivers serve as informants, money changers help with 
money transfers from Central America or the United States, food vendors (Interview, 19 
August 2013). Some neighbors, particularly poor and unemployed youngsters, act as 
lookouts. 
Perpetrators. The story with which I started this article illustrates the role of 
perpetrators well. Two young Hondurans were tricked by a rancher to follow a path that led 
them to a garbage dump. Once there, two ordinary and armed Mexicans assaulted them. 
Federico Mastrogiovanni (2013) documented the case of a 19-year-old Honduran 
kidnapped by a family of ordinary Mexicans. He was gay. While he was kept in captivity, he 
was raped, beaten, and extorted. Several days passed, the family took him to a “safe house” 
in another city, where he was awaited by a cartel that forced him to practice prostitution in 
brothels. The people who captured this person and then sold him to a criminal group were 
not members of any cartel; they were a common family: “A family that used to live off coffee 
farming is now dedicated to assaulting defenseless migrants” (Mastrogiovanni, 2013: 152). 
 
Conclusions 
This article offers a critical view of what is taking place with transit migration in Mexico, 
giving an alternative perspective to the dominant literature that currently exists on the subject, 
which is based on the idea of securitization. Restrictive immigration laws and practices are 
not new, they have existed in post-colonial Mexico for decades and are founded on racial and 
racist premises. In practice, as this article showed, state officials do not detain migrants 
because they are considered a threat to national security, but because they make economic 
gains from them. Moreover, cartels and ordinary Mexicans participate in this industry too. 
They are not inspired by ideas on national security, but they are behind the mass kidnapping, 
mistreatment, torture, disappearance, and death of thousands of Central American citizens 
who cross Mexico every year.  
Hence, this article explored the political economy of transit migration in Mexico. It 
sought to understand the unspeakable abuses suffered by migrants as one of the effects of 
local and global economies that generate profits from migrant mobility. In Mexico, the 
migration industry is possible because Central American migrants go through a process of 
“thingification” and gradually become “cheap merchandise”. Before reaching the United 
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States, Central American migrants are traded in Mexico as disposable commodities whose 
exploitation generates different kinds of opportunities: economic, in social mobility, to show 
and feel power. Migrants’ lives are socially induced to transience. 
Let me conclude this article with a final thought about victims and perpetrators. 
Central American migrants and their families are resilient. The disappearance and death of 
thousands of migrants in Mexico has recently led to the creation of dozens of non-
governmental organizations in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. These organizations 
are mainly run by migrants who crossed Mexico and were deported to their communities of 
origin, or by the mothers, wives, and sisters of migrants who are missing. These organizations 
have created links among themselves, building transnational networks that seek to influence 
Mexico's migration policies. These organizations have succeeded, to some extent, in re-
humanizing migrants so that they are no longer seen as objects. 
Yet there are also migrants who went from being victims to being perpetrators of 
crimes. Those providing testimonies collected for this research concur that some migrants 
become involved with criminal organizations to kidnap other migrants. Some even formed 
their own criminal organizations to traffic or scam their compatriots and families. As Vogt 
(2013: 773) found in her research on migrants in transit through Mexico: “money is thicker 
than blood”. 
This article provided a detailed account of how members of organized crime and 
ordinary citizens perpetrate abuses against migrants. But, to some extent, are some of these 
perpetrators not also victims? As I explained before, the neoliberal economic policies of the 
last 30 years have led to the deterioration of the standard of living of the majority of the 
population in Mexico. More than half of the population lives in conditions of poverty. 
Millions of young people in Mexico have no choice but to work in the informal economy, 
which is largely controlled by organized crime. This includes the migration industry. Like 
migrants, these groups of dispossessed people in Mexico are victims of structural violence: 
poverty and deprivation. 
 
 
Notes 
1 The interviews were carried out in 2013-15 and should be read against the period of the “drugs war” from 
2006 to 2015. Since then, the “drugs war” has persisted and the findings can plausibly be extended to the 
present. 
21 
 
 
2 In 1983, Mexico transformed its economy and adopted neoliberal policies based on the International 
Monetary Fund’s recipes. This meant lower government borrowing to discourage high fiscal deficits, freely-
floating currency exchange rates, cuts in government subsidies that affected rural farmers, lower corporate 
taxes, relaxing rules that obstruct foreign direct investment and competition, free trade policies, and the 
privatization of public assets. This led to a decrease in wages and salaries, and a significant rise of 
unemployment. 
3 It is important to note that the perpetration of serious abuses against migrants takes place mainly on the 
routes they take to travel through Mexico from Central America to the United States. There are two main 
routes. The first crosses eastern Mexico through the states of Veracruz and Tamaulipas to enter the United 
States through Texas. The second crosses the western part of Mexico, through the states of Oaxaca, 
Michoacan, Sinaloa and Sonora, to enter the United States through California and Arizona. Most migrants 
from El Salvador and Honduras take the eastern route, while a significant number of Guatemalan citizens take 
the western route. 
4 This does not mean that the link between security and migration has been the same over the past 50 years. 
Certainly, that link has evolved over the years (Guevara Bermudez 2014). What this article seeks to highlight 
is that the relationship between security and migration is not new, as most studies on the securitization of 
migration in Mexico tend to believe. 
5 The fact that it is more difficult for undocumented migrants to cross the US border has resulted in the 
proliferation of smugglers and the increase in their fees, and has also contributed to criminal groups in 
Mexico taking part in the business of migration as it is seen as an increasingly lucrative business. Thus, the 
immigration industrial complex in the US has a clear effect on the situation of migrants when they are in 
transit through Mexico. 
6 Certainly, one can be both a consumer and a commodity at the same time, and produce profit for others in 
both capacities. 
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